Abstract: While ASEAN recognises the need to strengthen its institutions, as reflected in its commitment to undertake greater institutionalisation efforts mandated by the ASEAN Charter, the willingness of member states to rely on regional institutions is still circumscribed by strong attachment to the principle of sovereignty and preference for maintaining unity amid regional diversity. In that context, the idea of constructing a supra-national authority -which requires the shifting of the locus of decision-making from national capital to a regional bureaucracy--has never been an attractive option for any ASEAN member state. The reliance on regional institutions is accepted as long as it would not undermine national sovereignty and endanger regional unity. In this context, ASEAN's institutionalisation will continue to reflect member states' dilemma in reconciling the need for strong and effective regional institutions on the one hand and the overriding concerns over maintaining national autonomy and preserving regional diversity on the other. The imperative of deeper regional integration, however, would make it more difficult for ASEAN to escape the need for further institutional changes.
Introduction
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite its origin as a loose and modest inter-governmental regional organisation aimed at preventing inter-state conflicts through economic and socio-cultural cooperation among its members, has now evolved into an association of sovereign states with a more ambitious agenda of regional integration. That plan is reflected in the commitment to initiate "regional community-building" process as the main agenda of regional cooperation. Indeed, when ASEAN took a formal decision to transform itself into an ASEAN Community in October 2003, member states declared, "an ASEAN Community shall be established comprising of three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation." 1 They also affirmed that the transformation of ASEAN into an ASEAN Community would transform the Association into a people-oriented organisation and ensure "durable peace, stability, and shared prosperity in the region." 2 In order to achieve the noble goal of becoming a regional community, ASEAN leaders realised that some institutional changes were required. In 2005, ASEAN leaders agreed on the need for ASEAN to have a charter that would "facilitate community building towards an ASEAN Community and beyond." 3 In this regards, the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in November 2007 was declared by ASEAN leaders as "a historic milestone for ASEAN, representing our common vision and commitment to the development of an ASEAN Community…" 4 Indeed, as it promises to transform ASEAN into a more rules-based organisation rather than a loosely organised association, the ASEAN Charter serves as an important step towards, and a confirmation of ASEAN's commitment to, the realisation of the ASEAN Community.
It was seen as a manifestation of the collective desire to accelerate the process of regional integration among member states. One important prerequisite for a deeper integration has been the promise to strengthen ASEAN's own institutions. In this regard, the Charter also serves as the legal basis for further institutionalisation of ASEAN.
The promise to strengthen institutional frameworks of ASEAN, while reflecting member states' awareness of the need for strong institutions in order to achieve the objective of ASEAN Community, can also be seen as a collective response to criticisms and challenges facing ASEAN. Since its establishment in August 1967, criticisms of ASEAN have been primarily directed at deficiencies in the organisational structures and the slow pace of institutionalisation of the Association. Indeed, the inadequacy in ASEAN's institutional frameworks was often seen as the main reason for the lack of progress. Until recently, the slow pace of institutionalisation has often been justified within the context of ASEAN's main objective of preventing inter-state conflicts through cooperation rather than constructing a regional community through regional integration.
As ASEAN Member States (AMS) have now committed themselves to deeper integration process towards an ASEAN Community beyond 2015, the need for greater and deeper institutionalisation has become more urgent. In this context, three main questions deserve further analysis. First, how far would ASEAN member states rely on regional institutions to drive the integration process? Second, to what extent the quality and authority of existing ASEAN institutions is adequate to the task? Third, if not, how much and in which area should ASEAN member states give more authority and capacity to ASEAN institutions?
This paper argues that while ASEAN had in the past undertaken measures to strengthen and expand its institutions, and ASEAN's recent commitment to undertake greater institutionalisation efforts have been manifested in the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, the willingness of member states to rely on regional institutions is still circumscribed by member states' attachment to the principle of sovereignty and overriding preference for maintaining unity amid regional diversity (as reflected in persistent inter-state problems and diverging interests). In that context, the idea of constructing a supra-national authority -which requires the shifting of the locus of decision-making from national capital to a regional bureaucracy--has never been an attractive notion for any ASEAN member state. The reliance on regional institutions is accepted as long as it would not undermine national sovereignty and endanger regional unity. In this context, ASEAN's efforts at institutionalisation will continue to reflect member states' dilemma in reconciling the imperative of strong and effective regional institutions for regional integration on the one hand and the overriding concerns over maintaining national autonomy and preserving regional diversity on the other.
The discussion is divided into three sections. The first section traces back ASEAN's experience in institutionalisation since its establishment in August 1967. The analysis in this section will provide valuable insights not only on the conditions under which significant phases of institutionalisation had occurred in the past, but also on the limits within which the institutionalisation were carried out. The analysis in this section will provide insight on the extent to which ASEAN member states would rely on regional institutions to drive the integration process. The second section discusses the limits of existing ASEAN's institutional frameworks within the context of the Association's plan to transform itself into an ASEAN Community by 2015. The focus of the analysis will be on the nature and characteristics of ASEAN-generated institutions, the norms on which these institutions operate, and the national and regional contexts that define ASEAN member states' attitude in managing the dilemma of regionalisation and sovereignty/regional diversity. The third section provides some suggestions on what ASEAN could and should do in order to fulfil its own promise to transform itself into a rules-based organisation and accelerate the process of regional integration, without necessarily becoming a supranational institution.
The Evolution of ASEAN's Institutionalisation:
The Primacy of "ASEAN Way" and the Impetus for Change
The First Three Decades (1967-1997)
When it was established in August 1967, ASEAN did not set for itself an ambitious task of becoming a regional organisation equipped with complex institutional structures and machinery in order to function effectively and immediately. Nor did it pretend to be an organisation that aspired to accomplish a set of concrete objectives in short or medium terms. It did not even stipulate the need for a multilateral summitry. On the contrary, ASEAN's leaders began their cooperative endeavour with a set of modest objectives. They maintained that the primary objective of ASEAN was "to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership..." 5 It was understood, however, that the conspicuous absence of political-security cooperation in the declared areas of cooperation did not mean the absence of political goal. On the contrary, ASEAN consciously chose the path of socio-economic cooperation to foster regional reconciliation among the founding members.
Indeed, the necessity to foster regional reconciliation constituted one key reason behind the formation of ASEAN. Prior to its establishment, the politico-security situation in Southeast Asia was characterised by various conflicts among its prospective members, with Indonesia-Thailand relations as an exception. Indonesia just ended its policy of konfrontasi (confrontation) against Malaysia and Singapore. MalaysiaPhilippines bilateral relations were strained by Manila's claim over Sabah. Thailand was suspicious of Kuala Lumpur's intention towards the Malay-dominated areas of its Southern provinces. In this context, "the necessity to co-operate…is deemed a function of a 'hostile' environment." (Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 1986 ). ASEAN's immediate achievement had been to sustain a condition for peace following the restoration of relations between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
Regional reconciliation through regional cooperation required a set of agreed principles, norms and rules that would guide the conduct of foreign relations among participating countries. First, it was understood from the outset that for such regional project to succeed, intra-mural relations should be predicated upon the requirement to respect national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs as the primary means of conflict prevention. Through this approach, "each member refrains from criticizing the policies of others in public" and this, in turn, "allows the ASEAN members to subdue any bilateral tensions." (Katsumata, 2003) . Second, regional stability could only be assured if regional countries were able to concentrate on "putting its own house in order" by addressing issues of domestic importance such as economic development, internal stability, and regime security. Third, it was understood also that cooperation should take a non-legal form based on a mechanism of decisionmaking defined in terms of consultation and consensus. Fourth, differences were to be resolved through informal and collegial manner, not through the application of legal means of conflict resolution.
Through the application of these principles, norms and rules -which later known as the ASEAN Way-the Association represented an experiment at constructing a regional order that allowed member states to focus on, and devote their resources for, the more pressing task of nation-building. This focus on coping with internal challenges also helped mitigating internal sources of regional problems. For example, it is important to note that some of these bilateral conflicts, especially Jakarta's konfrontasi against Malaysia-Singapore, were driven by power struggle and internal instability in Indonesia. Construed in this way, ASEAN was, and for some members still is, a national sovereignty-enhancing form of regional cooperation. Indeed, as stipulated in ASEAN's founding document, cooperation should be guided by the imperative of preserving national identities of member states. 6 Throughout its existence, the slow evolution of ASEAN's institutional structures reflected and had been carried out within the context of member states' strict adherence to these elements of corporate culture. Institutions put in place were very modest (Davidson, 1994) . There was also the shift towards sub-regional economic co-operation such as the establishment of the "growth triangle" projects (Singapore-Johor-Riau--SIJORI and Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle--IMTGT). Moreover, the AEM, which was previously overshadowed by the AMM, has also begun to play a more active role in formulating new proposals for greater economic cooperation, culminating in the agreement, reached at the Singapore Summit in 1992, to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). These developments were seen as a "quantum leap in the history of ASEAN economic cooperation." (Abad, 1986) . It also represents an "aberration" from the slow progress of ASEAN economic cooperation over the past twenty-five years since its establishment (Akrasanee and Stifel, 1992) . However, it is important to note that the institutionalisation of the Summit and the upgrading of the status of the Secretary General did not signify a fundamental change in the nature of ASEAN as a loose regional association. In fact, it reinforced the nature of ASEAN as an organisation that accords priority to the primacy of national sovereignty.
Greater involvement of leaders ensured that ASEAN remained an inter-governmental form of cooperation. Despite the new status given to the Secretary-General, "the scope for independent action on the part of the ASEAN Secretary-general is highly circumscribed." (Chin, 1994, p.18) . Again, the restructuring of the ASEAN Secretariat at this stage remained overshadowed by the primacy of national sovereignty. Greater efforts at institution-building, driven by greater recognition of new challenges and the expansion of agenda of economic cooperation, was undertaken in a way that reflected ASEAN's predicament: how to strengthen regional institutions without necessarily transforming itself into a supra-national organisation.
Indeed, ASEAN states were not prepared to surrender their national sovereignty to a regional institution of a supranational type. In this regard, it can be argued that ASEAN institutional development has been guided by this major constraint. Reflecting the Association's guiding principle, the slow evolution of ASEAN's institutional structures reinforced the nature of the Association as a loose inter-governmental form of cooperation that gives highest priority to the preservation of national sovereignty; hence its reluctance to move towards regional "integration" which would require member states "to transfer" a degree of national sovereignty to a regional entity. In other words, institutional changes introduced at the 1992 Summit in Singapore, important as they were, still reflected ASEAN's strong preference to preserve national autonomy of member states. It took another decade before ASEAN finally began to introduce more meaningful and far-reaching changes.
Greater efforts at institution-building, driven by new challenges and the expansion of economic cooperation agenda, was undertaken in a way that reflected ASEAN's predicament: how to strengthen regional institutions without necessarily transforming itself into a supra-national organisation.

The Impetus for Change: ASEAN Institutionalisation Since the 1997/1998 Financial Crisis
ASEAN at the end of the 1990s was in a state of despair through tremendous challenges stemming from developments within the region and outside. Regionally, the financial crisis that swept the region by the end of 1997, and the attendant turmoil and dramatic political change in Indonesia, raised doubts about ASEAN's credibility and its ability to cope with the crisis. For ASEAN, the crisis also reminded ASEAN that the region could not rely on extra-regional forces -especially the IMF--to provide a solution to its own problem (Hernandez, 2002) . The inability of ASEAN to respond to the carnage in East Timor, which paved the way for the Australian-led multinational forces to restore order, served as an uneasy reminder about the limit of ASEAN's ability to address security problems in its own region. The expansion of membership to include all remaining Southeast Asian countries, while being celebrated as the realisation of the dream of one Southeast Asia, posed new challenges for ASEAN, especially in narrowing the development gap between the old and new members.
Externally, ASEAN found that the forces of globalisation had eroded its competitiveness in the world market, forcing it to recognise the imperatives of greater economic integration among themselves. At the same time, ASEAN was also loosing its competitiveness to China that was rapidly becoming more powerful as an economic power. In short, ASEAN was confronted with a situation where its relevance was at risk and its credibility questioned. At the end, Indonesia did not succeed in getting the support for all its proposals.
The idea of the ASC was accepted, but in a much watered down form. 8 However,
Indonesia's drive for reform during its chairmanship did pave the way for greater changes in ASEAN with significant implications for ASEAN's institutionalisation. states' attachment to the principle of sovereignty and overriding preference for maintaining unity amid regional diversity. It also reflects ASEAN's predicament on how to strengthen regional institutions without necessarily transforming itself into a supra-national organisation.
The ASEAN Charter and Challenges to Institutionalisation: Sovereignty, Regional Unity and National Autonomy
It is true that the ASEAN Charter, which came into force in December 2008, has provided ASEAN with new institutional frameworks. Even tough questions have been raised whether the Charter really offers "transformative value" or it just constitutes a declaration of normative intent, four elements of the Charter are of paramount importance in this regard. First, and foremost, the Charter gives ASEAN a legal personality. Second, the Charter articulates new (and old) objectives of regional cooperation, with the intention to become a regional community based on three pillars as the most important one. Third, it pledges to change the nature of ASEAN as a statedominated process into a people-oriented organisation. Fourth, it provides the provisions for strengthening ASEAN's institutional pillars and streamlining its decisionmaking structures. In short, the ASEAN Charter purportedly represents a highest form of commitment among ASEAN member states to transform the grouping into a rulesbased organisation, equipped with better institutional structures that will enable the Association to achieve its objectives and withstand current and future challenges.
Indeed, it is important to recognise that the ASEAN Charter does introduce a number of institutional changes in order to "streamline ASEAN's cumbersome and uncoordinated organisational structure..." (Koh, et al., 2007) . In doing so, the Charter Despite the promise to become a people-oriented organisation, it is largely still a statedriven process, even though non-state actors in some (more democratic) members do exercise a degree of influence over national policies of member states towards ASEAN.
It is still a regional organisation where progress (or lack of it) in implementing cooperative agenda is still determined by the political will of member states rather than by an implementing agency of a supra-national body. 
The Need for Further Change: Proposals For Post-2015 ASEAN
Given these constraints, the existing institutions would not be adequate in achieving ASEAN's goals and objectives, namely (1) to promote regional community-building, with specific objectives of facilitating economic integration, undertaking conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and becoming a people oriented organisation, (2) to sustain ASEAN's centrality in the emerging regional order, and (3) to present a more cohesive voice in a global community of nations. Institutional changes and promises introduced by the ASEAN Charter are still inadequate and, in some cases, might even complicate the process of ASEAN community-building. 9 First, as the EPG has noted, the main problem with ASEAN is not lack of vision, but the lack of responsibility to implement. 10 Indeed, implementation depends on member states, which might be more concerned with its own domestic priorities rather than regional commitments and obligations. Second, ASEAN's agreements are still non-binding in nature, due to the absence of mechanism to enforce compliance and ASEAN's aversion to sanctionregimes. Breaches of agreements would go unpunished. Third, the problem of implementation is also exacerbated by ASEAN's reluctance to give real power of implementation to a regional body such as the ASEAN Secretariat. The central issue that gives rise to these three problems has been, and still is, ASEAN's refusal to create a space that would reduce national autonomy of member states.
If ASEAN really wants to be able to deliver, then it needs to initiate further institutional changes. Three points, however, need to be kept in mind. First, it is important to recognise that the preservation of national autonomy will continue to be accorded a highest priority in foreign policy of ASEAN member states. Second, the preference for national autonomy, however, is also increasingly complemented with the growing awareness about the importance of respecting and fulfilling regional obligations. Third, ASEAN continues to face a dilemma on how to commit to regional obligations without necessarily sacrificing national autonomy. In other words, the proposed changes should be framed within the context of member states' dilemma in reconciling the imperative of strong and effective regional institutions for regional integration on the one hand and the overriding concerns over maintaining national autonomy and preserving regional diversity on the other. Therefore, the following suggestions might help ASEAN transform itself into a rules-based organisation and accelerate the process of regional integration, without necessarily becoming a supranational institution.
First, ASEAN needs to change its decision-making mode and procedures. As a general rule, ASEAN should not discard consensus as the fundamental principle of decision-making, but consensus should not be equated with unanimity. It should introduce voting as a mode of decision-making, especially on non-sensitive issues. At the moment, while consultation (musyawarah) is retained as the primary process for decision-making, the Charter stipulates that "where consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN Summit may decide how a specific decision can be made." In such an event, it is very likely that ASEAN leaders would also resort to the process of consensus-seeking in order to resolve differences. Consequently, differences and dispute would get swept under the carpet due to the need to find the lowest common denominator for the sake of tenuous regional unity.
Second, ASEAN needs to establish a mechanism to enforce compliance. This will require ASEAN to introduce two processes:
(a) Establish an independent Assessment Task Force. There is a need for outside, independent assessment of ASEAN's progress. The task should be carried out by those within ASEAN or among ASEAN's stakeholders within the region. For example, within ASEAN, the assessment body -the ASEAN Assessment Task Force--should be comprised of prominent citizens (non-governmental, but appointed by governments) from ASEAN countries. From ASEAN's stakeholders, it can be prominent institutions such as ERIA. ERIA has already done this regarding the implementation of the AEC through its studies on AEC Scorecard. Difficult as it might be, the same should also be done with regards to the other two pillars. In fact, progress in economic cooperation cannot be sustained without a solid political-security foundation that the APSC seeks to create and a sense of One Community that the ASCC attempts to encourage. Seventh, ASEAN needs to introduce, clarify and institutionalise the mechanism for engagement with CSOs. ASEAN has pledged that it would transform itself to become a people-oriented organisation. Yet, this objective cannot be fulfilled unless ASEAN interacts in an institutionalised way with civil society organisations -ASEAN's main constituencies--in all ten members. Unfortunately, ASEAN does not have a mechanism through which it could engage the CSOs. Therefore, leaders need to agree on a clear mechanism by which greater and institutionalised participation by the people can be ensured, and the people -through various CSOs--can be granted regular access to ASEAN processes in general and to the leaders in particular.
Eight, ASEAN has to improve and strengthen the dispute-settlement mechanism.
Dispute might come from three types of problems: traditional inter-state conflict, differences in interpretation of the provisions contained in the ASEAN Charter, and differences regarding whether or not a member state has implemented an agreement.
ASEAN should start discussing how they would resolve the three types of disputes whenever they arise. The existing ASEAN's formulation on dispute settlement continues to rely on the "wisdom" of the leaders. The Charter declares "when a dispute remains unresolved, after the application of the preceding provisions of this Chapter, this dispute shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit, for its decision. Regional integration could be achieved faster with a regional body with a regional perspective. ASEAN Secretariat should be transformed to become such a body.
Conclusion
ASEAN had been at the crossroads since 1998 when, in 2003, it decided to choose the path towards greater regional integration by becoming an ASEAN Community based on three pillars. Ten years later, it seems that ASEAN found itself at another crossroads. This time, unlike in 1998 and 2003 when the decisions to reform reflected ASEAN's awareness of its own intra-mural problems, the impetus for change would come more from extra-regional circumstances. ASEAN cannot stand at the crossroad for too long if it does not want to be rolled over by the passing giant forces --China, US, Japan, and India--locked in a complex set of competitive and cooperative relationship. 
